The assessment of scholarly literature on the Information Society provided in this paper sets out and distinguishes between the analytical foundations of mainstream and critical contributions from a selection of disciplines and fields with a view to considering why there is so little reciprocal engagement among them and whether there are new opportunities to promote a dialogue with those who hold the power to establish policies and investment practices with regard to information and communication technologies.
Introduction 1
The aim of this paper is to provide a critical assessment of some of the scholarly literature within several branches of the social sciences that focus on 'The Information Society'. This assessment is based on a review of some 800 works published in English from the late 1940s to 2008 with a focus predominantly on historical perspectives, the works of those grappling with the economic relationships between information, knowledge and society; issues of democracy, governance and regulation; and the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in every day life. 2 It will come as no surprise to readers that the 'The Information Society' denotes a notoriously fuzzy
concept. There are many critical assessments of this concept in the literature. My purpose in the present paper is to examine the analytical foundations of works that consider the 'life and times' of The Information Society, originating within the disciplines mainly of economics, politics and sociology as well as within the fields of media and communication studies and science and technology studies.
I acknowledge that there are many other disciplines and fields of study that have tackled information and knowledge problems. However, it is scholars from the areas surveyed here who have worked to influence the direction of policy making and actions at the institutional level, intending to build societies that have come to be labelled collectively -
The Information Society. 3 We know from the existing literature that discussions in this area frequently embrace dystopian or utopian sentiments with respect to the possibilities offered by new technologies. The opening quotation seems to capture these, albeit in a literary form. In this paper I want to consider some of the reasons that there is so little reciprocal engagement across the boundaries of relevant disciplines and fields. Or, indeed, among those who see the challenge of building The Information Society as one primarily of investment in technologies to improve the quantity, speed and reach of the circulation of information and those for whom such investment is justified (if at all) only by the individual or societal goals that are achieved in so doing. My overall argument is that while critical scholars offer much insight into the problematic nature of the concept -The Information Society -we often fail to convince those who are not already persuaded that it is a problematic concept insofar as it does not provide a means for a consideration of the alternative societies that people may value. In this paper, my aim is not to search for 'the' alternative theory or set of practices that might address the problem, but rather to assess whether there are some potentially new opportunities to promote a dialogue that has greater purchase on those who hold the power to establish the policies and investment practices that will have consequences for the character of societies in the 21 st century.
It might be expected in the light of the importance of information of all kinds in human life, that research focusing on the life and times of 'The Information Society' would entice scholars with interests in both information production and consumption and in changes in society more generally, to undertake analysis of its meanings and implications.
And indeed it has. We might expect an interdisciplinary body of intellectual inquiry to have emerged during the past 50 years or so since scholarly work started to focus on issues around information and communication control systems. My review of published works indicates, however, that there is relatively little cross-citation although, of course,
there are a few very frequently cited authors. This is unsurprising in the light of the persistence of disciplinary enclaves, but it is noteworthy that it is mainly, though not exclusively, insights arising within the discipline of economics that seem to influence policy makers, albeit indirectly, in this area.
This has important consequences because it means that many of the important social dynamics of societal change are persistently downplayed. This process of exclusion of certain issues from the agenda of policy makers is aided by the continuing dominance of what I will call 'The Information Society' vision. In section 2, I review the origins of the 'The Information Society' concept, followed in section 3, by a synthesis of some of the scholarly critical appraisals of the concept. The perspectives of economists who puzzle over information and knowledge are considered in section 4 and their positions are then juxtaposed, in section 5, with those of others who have sought to understand the dynamics of diverse digitally mediated societies using frameworks based on considerations that are beyond the reach of the economists' analytical models. This leads me to a consideration in section 6 of why relatively few of the arguments that are critical of the predominant vision of "The Information Society' seem to filter into policy discussions. In section 7, I reflect on whether there is reason to hope or reason for despair regarding the likelihood of a change in the capacity of those who are critical of 'The Information Society' vision to make their voices are heard.
The Information Society Vision
In the early post-World War II period, a vision of what would come to be labelled 'The Information Society' began to crystallize. Scientists, engineers and mathematicians were interested in information and communication control systems and technologies that might help them to realize their hopes for the contributions of artificial intelligence and robotics. In the same period, economists were hoping that productivity gains reaped by mechanization could be replicated by automation. Policy makers were trying to maintain full employment and growth, and information workers (such as librarians and software engineers) were attempting to increase access to knowledge by crafting better tools for accessing information. The assumption that enormous social and economic benefits could be reaped by those best positioned to build on new ICTs quickly gained currency. (Wiener, 1956: 16) . His view was characteristic of those working on cybernetics who emphasised both the underlying technology and a 'sender-receiver' (S-R) model of communication. At about this time, although there were few interdisciplinary collaborations with social scientists, Bateson (1951) was an active contributor to the field. His theoretical model contextualised communicative processes in ways that highlighted many of the limitations of a simple 'S-R' model and offered insight into the way these processes are contextualised within wider social and cultural developments. This work was a precursor to the development of theories of the communicative process that acknowledge its situatedness and context-dependency, though this work has rarely informed discussions about 'The Information Society'.
In the United States, economists such as Machlup (1962 Machlup ( , 1980 and Porat and Rubin (1977) Bell (1979: 501) , the sociologist, 'the axial principle of the postindustrial society … is the centrality of theoretical knowledge and its new role, when codified, as the director of social change'. He said that the variables it was crucial to study were information and knowledge, 4 and that it was necessary to focus on business and management issues as well as broad societal concerns. For Bell, Drucker (1969) , a management consultant, and others, the challenge was to forge a strong commitment to technological innovation as the mobiliser of economic and social progress. 
A Problematic Vision
The hegemony of the singular construction -The Information Society -should not go unchallenged. 6 In this section I consider some of the arguments of those who have questioned the meaning implied by the singular, dominant vision offered by 'The This emphasis on society and on social processes as a counter to the scientism and determinism associated with the dominant vision is apparent in the work of numerous scholars. For example, Golding and Murdock (1978: 347) maintained that a priority should be to develop a theory of society with a focus on the implications of media and communication (or information) industry developments for social inequality. As they put it: 'determinism, in its arbitrary allocation of an unwarranted and unsupportable significance to the subject matter at hand, distorts beyond reprieve a balanced view of social structure and process' and leads to a neglect of 'sources of social dissent and political struggle'. Beniger's (1986) Lyon (1986: 586) similarly privileged society when he argued that it was unlikely that the dynamics of industrial capitalism would be altered substantially by the spread of digital technologies and Smythe ( 1977 Smythe ( , 1981 challenged the premise that 'The Information Society' would radically alter relations of political and economic dependency. Schiller (1981 Schiller ( , 1984 examined concentrations of corporate ownership, which he argued were enabling the interests of capitalists to prevail in 'The Information Society'. With Miège (1990), he argued that there was 'more menace than promise' in information technologies. What mattered was the 'the structural character of the world community and the quality of life and social existence it offers to all people' (Schiller, 1980: 313) , not only the privileged few with access to innovative technologies for communication and the production of content..
At about the same time, in the field of science and technology studies, Miles and Gershuny (1986) were examining the empirical evidence suggesting the growing economic significance of information in the economy. They concluded that even if information was of growing significance in the economy, this development was associated with very diverse service sectors and that analysis must be open to such diversity. 7 The statistical evidence pointing to a relatively homogeneous 'Information Society' has continued to be questioned (Menou and Taylor 2006) . Like Masuda who
argued that changes in society should be 'chosen, not given', Miles and Gershuny advocated debates on the economic implications of the unequal distribution of information resources and on alternative designs of ICTs, before the new systems are installed. Freeman and Soete (1990b) whose work associated the new ICTs with the revolutionary potential of a new paradigm for the organisation of the economy, also called for a resolution of conflicting interests through public debate, as institutions and ways of living were being re-shaped in parallel with technological innovations.
Others stressed the continuity of historically formed relations of power in society, notwithstanding the newness of technology. Murdock (1993: 537) , for instance, stressed that, rather than concluding that everything is transformed into a post-modern age as a result of innovations in technologies, the modern era should be seen as 'a complex articulation of formations, operating in different domains and at different levels'.
Somewhat later, Winston's (1998: 2) study revealed evidence of continuity between historical and modern social formations framed by the telegraph and the Internet. In contrast to those who focused on the disruptive or revolutionary character of innovations in ICTs, Winston and others, including Mattelart (2002) , Robertson (1990) , Schement (1990) and Tremblay (1995) , acknowledged the opportunities, but found the technologies were being implemented in ways that replicated existing inequalities within society.
For these scholars, if the dynamics of social reproduction were continuing to give rise to social and economic inequality, the likelihood was that innovations in ICTs would be complicit in this. For them, the social order was still characterised by: 'the worst of times'. Castells ' (1996, 1997, 1998) ..this fragmentation of societies between the included and the excluded is more than the expression of the time-lag required by the gradual incorporation of previous social forms into the new dominant logic. It is, in fact, a structural feature of the global network society' (Castells 2009: 25) .
For Castells, the dynamics of today's networks are associated with ideas, visions, projects and frames that generate actions that lead to exclusion and therefore to disadvantage (Castells 2009: 44) . Set against this bleak conclusion, he has come to regard 'mass self- Luhmann's (1996) systems theory, he argues that we can no longer [if we ever could] stand outside the system and critique it from some transcendent ideological position. Castells, in contrast, eschews the automaticity of the autopoietic or self-referential systems view.
What then are we to conclude about all this scholarly activity focusing in one way or another on the growing salience of information, on communication and, increasingly, on global networks? Has it challenged the dominant vision in ways that policy makers can understand; indeed has 'The Information Society' concept been helpful and if so to whom? Garnham (2000) has concluded that the concept is not helpful if the goal is to understand the way the actions of people -both the included and the excluded -give rise to stability or instability in the social order and to changes in the way society advances in line with the specific interests of those wielding power within the capitalist system. The concept has been instrumental in mobilizing a large number of initiatives supported by those who associate the new ICTs and globally networked information with better prospects for the 'best of times'. The concept, and its closely associated digital economy, creative economy, and knowledge society brethren, has stimulated the imaginations of investors in hardware, software and content in many ways. There is no doubt that dominant power relations have been challenged in some places and with variable consequences. This observation is not inconsistent, however, with the fact that there are deeply rooted inequalities in society and that these are not being magically overcome as a result of a digitally mediated society. This is so regardless of how often we are told that the poor can access new technologies such as mobile phones and many other digital artefacts.
In the next section, I consider perspectives on the economics of 'The Information Society' to demonstrate how these approaches downplay or avoid issues relating to the distribution of power, thereby yielding the dominant vision that suggests that we are all indeed on the cusp of the 'best of times'.
The Information Society Puzzle
Economists conclude that knowledge creation is an important driver of the economy.
Typically, they make little distinction between information and knowledge. It is a very short step for them from The Information Society to 'The Knowledge Society', that is, a society in which new knowledge 'fuels' development. As David and Foray (2003: 20) observe, 'knowledge has been at the heart of economic growth and the gradual rise in levels of social well-being since time immemorial. The ability to invent and innovate, that is to create new knowledge and new ideas that are then embodied in products, processes and organizations, has always served to fuel development'.
The emphasis on knowledge-based economic growth reflects an interest in intangible sources of economic value as a key driver of the economy. As they go on to say:
The crux of the issue lies in the accelerating (and unprecedented) speed at which knowledge is created, accumulated and, most probably, depreciates in terms of economic relevance and value. This trend has reflected, inter alia, an intensified pace of scientific and technological progress. … Knowledge-based activities emerge when people, supported by information and communication technologies, interact in concerted efforts to co-produce (i.e. create and exchange) new knowledge. (David and Foray 2003: 20, 27) Information is seen here as a prerequisite for knowledge production or co-production.
This creates difficulties for the economic analysis of market developments because, from an economic vantage point, information has peculiar characteristics compared to tangible goods. Information is intangible, non-rivalrous, and non-excludable. 8 Conventional economic models are not designed to take account of these features of information. In particular, once information is produced it requires considerable effort to prevent its being passed on to others. ICTs make the costs of information reproduction negligible, creating a paradox over how to finance its initial (first copy) production costs. Stigler (1961: 213) was quick to realize this, advising that 'one should hardly have to tell academicians that information is a valuable resource: Knowledge is power. And yet it occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics'. As the Internet has become the site of commercial activity, the argument that information is an 'experience good' has been popularized in the economics and management literatures, notably by Shapiro and Varian (1999) Without a vocabulary or model for considering power relations, economists turn instead to the factors that lead to increases in productivity, that is, to the possibility of producing more with constant capital and labour inputs. They seek to understand how technologies might be implicated in this. Increasing productivity is sufficient for economic growth, a central goal (or bias) of capitalist societies. ICTs are thought to play a special role because these technologies can be employed in many different contexts -across all sectors of the economy. They are regarded as General Purpose Technologies (GPT) (Lipsey et al., 2005) . Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995: 84) suggested that, 'most GPTs play the role of "enabling technologies", opening up new opportunities rather than offering complete, final solutions'. Despite this caveat about the incompleteness of technological solutions, much like earlier technologies with a pervasive effect such as the steam engine and electricity (David 1990) , it was assumed by many that the rapid diffusion of ICTs leading to 'informatisation' would result in a boost in productivity growth.
One of the 'enabling' features of ICTs for economists is their contribution to the increasing codification of information. Making little distinction between information and knowledge, it is argued that by codifying information in digital form, new knowledge can be circulated more widely, thereby 'fuelling' growth and economic development. Some insist that these opportunities imply new styles of learning, while others stress the importance of tacitness (i.e. knowing more than one can say) and the continuing need for support to those who can now access digital information in new ways (see Antonelli et al. 2000; Steinmueller 2000; Johnson et al. 2002 and Cowan et al. 2000 for the debates on these issues among economists). Once again, however, without a theory of the social processes of learning, or indeed, of individual cognitive processes, the economists are unable to do more than assert that certain transformations towards greater inclusiveness are possible.
In the contexts of these intellectual traditions, the 'The Information Society' vision remains problematically in the forefront of debate. Empirical evidence suggests that there are pronounced differences in the economic performance of countries which cannot be explained fully by differences in their levels of investment in digital technologies. Solow (1987: 36) said that 'you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics', leading to a debate among economists on the sources of productivity improvement (see Abramovitz and David 1996 , Gordon 2004 , Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000 . Some, such as Brynjolfsson and Hitt ( 2003) Research closely associated with the economics discipline, and which is very central to the field of science and technology studies, analyses how technological innovations lead to shifts in technological 'style' or in 'techno-economic paradigm' (see Freeman et al. 1982 , Freeman 1988 Freeman and Soete 1990a and Perez 1985 . This work seeks to explain why changes in technologies may have destabilizing effects on the economy.
These authors suggest that as a new technology spreads, a new 'common sense' starts to take hold that eventually pervades all aspects of individual and institutional endeavour.
Change may be disruptive, resulting in the obsolescence of skills and qualifications, and wealth creation for some as well as new means of exclusion for others. However, the foundations of this work in the economics discipline means that there are very limited conceptual tools to enable them to explain what this new 'common sense' implies for individuals or groups, or, indeed, why this common sense might be contested.
None of these approaches explicitly discuss power relations. As a result, although they do embrace departures from a normative vision in which all contributors to 'The Information Society' do so from a 'level playing field', they have no theoretical means of tackling the political, economic, social and cultural dynamics that yield distorted and inequitable relations as a result of the production and consumption of technologies and information services. Insofar as such distortions are variable in their intensity, they generally do not consider the differences among so-called information societies.
When we turn to scholarship that draws upon various social theories, there is much greater scope to develop differentiated understandings of the dynamics of information societies and to begin to unravel some aspects of the puzzles that challenge the economists.
Information Societies
A more differentiated set of expectations about the emergence of information societies is Similarly, Kraut et al. (2002) found that intensive use of the Internet generally is consistent with perceptions of well-being although these findings have been called into question by Boles et al. (2004) . Thus, the jury is out on the balance between positive and negative intra-subjective experience associated with the information societies emerging in different countries and regions around the world. 'These "ways of operating" constitute the innumerable practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production …to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of "discipline"' (Certeau, 1984: xiv-xv) In this tradition it is acknowledged that 'there can be no knowledge of the everyday without knowledge of society in its entirety' (Lefebvre (1962 (Lefebvre ( /2002 and so research is In the sphere of political theory, initially there was optimism that 'real world' democracy might be translated into online democracy: 'the public should be able to conduct meetings in cyberspace in ways that are as civil and democratic as in the real world' (Dutton, 1996: 288) . The democratizing potential of ICTs is envisaged in Lessig's (1999 Lessig's ( , 2006 argument that software code, embedded in networks, sets limits and constrains the norms for information exchange, but that these norms could be established so as to provide a basis for empowerment of individuals. Feenberg (1992: 319) suggests that the new technologies embody a 'subversive rationalization'; that is: 'individuals who are incorporated into new types of technical networks have learned to resist through the net itself in order to influence the powers that control it. This is not a contest for wealth or administrative power, but a struggle to subvert the technical practices, procedures, and designs structuring everyday life'. Similarly, discussions about the potential of edemocracy often emphasize that online deliberation 'could provide a basis for a more dialogical and deliberative democracy in place of the dialogue of the deaf which tends to characterize contemporary political representation' (Coleman 2005: 177) . From a different starting point, Dahlgren (2005) argues that the Internet is destabilizing for some aspects of democratic practice. Research in these traditions employs different theoretical approaches to power, yielding varying assessments of the scope for differentiation of societies which rely in new ways on mediated relationships for the conduct of political processes.
Finally, within research traditions that focus on the role of culture, power and language within dispersed, increasingly networked communities, there is considerable emphasis on whether these developments offer a basis for political action and resistance (Ribeiro, 1998 ). Ribeiro, for example, emphasises that the outcomes of cyberactivism are governed by power relationships enacted in the 'real', rather than in the cyber, world. Others such as Karim (2007) If we assume that our theories and empirical research do in fact offer a vantage point for social commentary on the policies and practices that 'should' be encouraged, how should we position ourselves with respect to policy debates that invoke this and related concepts?
The Policy Consequences
There are few instances of convergence between the different approaches to 'The Information Society' in the scholarly literature and there are similarly few signs of crossfertilisation of insights from these traditions when they travel into the policy domain.
The documents issued by policy organisations tend to be bifurcated between those offering a normative prescription for the optimal way of capitalizing on the claimed benefits of the production and use of ICTs in line with the dominant vision and those challenging this vision and seeking to acknowledge diversity and redress for processes that result in social exclusion and economic disadvantage (Mansell 2010) . 'The Information Society' concept serves as injunction and prescription for the former and as a flashpoint for criticism for the latter. In the absence of agreement about the normative foundations for information societies, it may be that policy makers can benefit from research findings that enable them to articulate alternatives to the dominant perspective. Garnham (1997) , for example, turned to the economist, Sen's (1999) work on capabilities and the choices people can exercise in their lives, as the basis for decisions about whether to intervene in market-led developments. In this context, the emphasis is on the multiple ways in which information societies might contribute to the well-being and achievements of human beings. 15 Garnham suggested that as connectivity to networks becomes essential to people's abilities to conduct their lives, there will be a requirement for some kind of regulatory intervention in the interest of fairness and equity. Unfortunately, insofar as there are discussions of fairness and equity, the discussion has focused on access to technology and rarely on the kinds of well-being and potentials for achievement that are fostered. And, as the Internet spreads and digital platforms (mobile phones) of all kinds become more accessible, it becomes more difficult to argue for policy or regulatory intervention as the neoliberal agenda envelops the new technologies as being progressive in every way (Couldry 2003) .
There are ongoing discussions about the need for formal regulation (or informal co-or self-regulation) of the Internet. In western countries, formal regulation is rarely attractive because of the prevailing view that the development of the Internet (The Information Society) requires unrestricted experimentation and an open space in which voluntary contributions can be made. This area is dominated by claims about the importance of 'Net neutrality', that is, the retention of a network architecture that does not privilege or discriminate among content and applications, rather than by debates about the public's interest in various types of content or services (see Bar et al. 2000; Owen 2007) . Net neutrality invokes the idea that the Internet should be available to all on a uniform, nondiscriminatory basis without differentiation in terms of quality of service; that is, it should be a transparent, end-to-end network. But as McChesney (1996) argues, the Internet is not neutral because developers and users include large commercial companies.
Insofar as it is these companies that set policy and practice with respect to issues of privacy, security, and copyright and related issues, there are often good grounds for policy or regulatory intervention. Self-regulation by Internet service providers, such as that encouraged by the UK's Internet Watch Foundation 16 which aims to reduce illegal child abuse images and other threats, 17 continues to be discussed, but such debates frequently are conducted within the framings offered by 'The Information Society' vision. individual's condition in the world that reaches beyond production and the money economy to consider peoples beliefs and the things that they value. In this area, efforts are being devoted to the development of metrics to assess national happiness and the results suggest that increasing wealth is related in complicated ways to measures of happiness. 20 In this work we find economists turning to insights from the psychology discipline to understand the complexity of societies and the information base that can best serve decision makers who seek to guide them.
Others go further to challenge the academy and decision makers to eschew the rationality and objectivity of (social) science and to draw insight from traditions that value wisdom.
This work is concerned with ethical practice or practical wisdom, drawing upon the classics including the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, and arguing that in the context of management and organisational learning, a more humanistic epistemology is needed to ensure that choices that affect the lives of all people are informed by wisdom and ethical virtue (Rowley and Gibbs 2008 , Rooney and McKenna 2005 . These approaches do not lend themselves easily to the quantifiable metrics so valued by those who are guiding society. 21 Although these approaches offer interesting reflections on the relations between, and valuations of, the information -knowledge -wisdom nexus, they do not easily offer an answer to questions about whose wisdom or insight is to count or matter insofar as there may be multiple contending priorities for investment and action.
This brings us to the question of whether there is evidence of any greater receptivity to those who want to put the case for a more variegated, pluralistic and open vision of societies which does not presume that investment in ICTs and information or knowledge creation, following the dominant models developed in the 'Global North', are the solutions to persistent human disadvantage and poverty.
Conclusion
Whether the opportunities created by the spread of digital technologies make a beneficial difference in people's lives in the future will be strongly influenced by the extent to which the dominant vision of 'The Information Society' is successfully challenged in ways that reach out to those best-positioned to formulate policy and decide on investment strategies with respect to technology and with respect to the cultural and social contexts of their uses. Scholars who regard themselves as legitimate participants in domains of policy or practice -as more than spectators -may criticize the 'The Information Society' vision and argue that it misleads or even averts our gaze from the dynamics of the economy and society that give rise to inequality and exclusion, but we cannot ignore it. The consequences of this vision are playing themselves out in people's lives, often producing new articulations of inequality. We need to know why and how this occurs so that resources can be mobilized to reduce the social, political and economic harms that emerge. We need to challenge the prevailing 'common sense' or 'wisdom' to consider a broader range of alternatives than those normally considered within the framework of 'The Information Society' vision.
Proponents of alternative visions of information societies will continue to struggle to convince decision makers -in policy forums and in the commercial world -that asymmetrical relationships perpetuated by the 'The Information Society' vision are replicating relations of inequality and injustice. Challenges to this vision inevitably threaten power structures and are often interpreted as threats to the survival of incumbent firms, whether in the field of journalism, markets for broadcast or film production or technology and information services provision.
Societies in the 21 st century are very fluid and diverse, mediated increasingly by networks underpinned by convergent ICTs. In challenging 'The Information Society' vision it is important to ensure that we do not become caught between the rejection of 'a hegemonic Eurocentrism' (Dirlik 2004: 146) , that is, a view informed by the principles and common sense norms consistent with the experience of the 'Global North', and a reactionary localism that rejects developments in ICTs and all digital sources of information, espoused in the name of the 'Global South'. In imagining information societies that foster greater efficacy, social justice, and well-being, analysis should focus on the values informing initiatives to build these societies. The fact that such values are contested needs to be acknowledged much more explicitly than is typically done in policy debates today. A principal aim of social science investigation is to illuminate processes that would otherwise be obscured by common habits of thought or belief. Our analysis has demonstrated the value of shifting the perspective away from the supply of new technologies and from a concern with the economic determinants of diffusion and assessments of social and economic impact. Instead, we have developed our analysis with a focus on uses and users and on the economic, social, technological and institutional issues surrounding participation in the information society.
The polarisation of views between the 'worst' and the 'best' of times, between utopians and dystopians, between those who envisage many benefits for all in virtual worlds and those who resist the dominant vision, is unhelpful. More productive is a view that acknowledges that we are involved in neither a revolutionary digital era nor in an era of straightforward incremental change and continuity with the past. Norms, values, conventions and aspirations for the societies within which we live are changing, but they are not changing autonomously in response to the technologies of 'The Information Society'. They are changing in response to human actions and decisions that are ongoing, contested and uneven in their outcomes. This is so despite the persistence of the voices of those who promote the singular, universalising vision of the 'best of times'.
